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Abstract:  Bofinger  (2001)  had  built  a  macroeconomic  model  that  tried  to  integrate  the  financial 
intermediation feature of the Bernanke-Blinder model with the “exogenous” character of money market 
interest rate. In the so-called IS-CM model there are two interest rates: the credit or banking interest 
rate, determined by the interactions between goods market and credit market clearing conditions, and 
the money market interest rate, set by monetary authorities. Up to now no efforts are made in the way 
to analyse the dynamics of Bofinger model under different assumptions about the determination of 
money market interest rate. The objective of this paper is to analyse the stability properties of Bofinger 
(2001) model under different monetary policy rules. More specifically we will consider four different 
cases: (a) strict inflation targeting; (b) strict inflation targeting plus anti-cyclical fiscal policy; (c) strict 
output targeting and (d) “double mandate” for Central Bank (output and inflation stabilization). As we 
will see, long-run equilibrium of the model can be stable only in cases (a) and (d); which means that the 
existence  of  nominal  anchor  is  of  fundamental  importance  for  macroeconomic  stability.  We  also 
conclude that an anti-cyclical fiscal policy is incompatible with macroeconomic stability under a strict 
inflation targeting regime.  
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Resumo:  Bofinger  (2001)  desenvolveu  um  modelo  macroeconômico  com  o  intuito  de  integrar  o 
arcabouço financeiro da intermediação financeira de Bernanke-Blinder com o caráter exógeno da taxa 
básica de juros do mercado monetário. Assim, temos o modelo IS-CM onde existem duas taxas de juros, 
a saber: taxa de juros do crédito bancário, determinada pela interação entre o mercado de bens e o 
mercado de crédito; e a taxa de juros de mercado, determinada pela autoridade monetária. Até então, 
nenhum esforço havia sido empregado com o intuito de se analisar a dinâmica do modelo de Bofinger 
sob diferentes hipóteses acerca dos determinantes da taxa básica de juros. Sendo assim, o objetivo 
desse artigo é analisar as propriedades da estabilidade dinâmica do modelo de Bofinger sob diferentes 
regras de política monetária. Mais especificamente, iremos considerar quatro casos distintos: (a) regime 
de  metas  de  inflação  estrito;  (b)  metas  de  inflação  em  conjunto  com  utilização  de  políticas  fiscais 
anticíclicas (c) regime de metas de produto estrito; (d) existência de um duplo mandato para o Banco 
Central em termos de produto e estabilização da inflação. Vamos mostrar, ainda, que a estabilidade 
dinâmica do modelo só é encontrada nos casos (a) e (d), de tal sorte que a existência de uma âncora 
nominal  é  fundamental  para  a  estabilidade  macroeconômica.  Sendo  assim,  podemos  concluir  que 
políticas  fiscais  anticíclicas  são  incompatíveis  com  a  estabilidade  macroeconômica  sob  o  arranjo  do 
regime de metas de inflação. 
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1.  Introduction.  
Since the seminal work of Bernanke (1983), we are told that non-monetary effects 
related to the workings of the credit markets are of fundamental importance for 
the explanation of the magnitude and duration of the Great Depression. However, 
the standard macroeconomic model, the IS-LM, developed by Hicks (1937) and 
Modigliani  (1944),  had  no  room  for  changes  in  the  conditions  of  financial 
intermediation to affect aggregate demand and output. The inclusion of the credit 
market in the structure of the IS-LM model was made by Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988). One of the main theoretical results of their model is that money targeting 
policy rule can be destabilizing if money-demand shocks are more important than 
credit-demand shocks. In this case, it is recommended a policy that aims to target 
the level (or the rate of expansion) of credit rather than the level of money stock.  
Bernanke and Blinder model, however, has a fundamental flaw for the point of 
view of operation of monetary policy: it supposes that money market interest rate 
is an endogenous variable that results from the interaction between the credit 
market and money market clearing conditions. This is not the way that Central 
Banks conduct monetary policy. As shown by Romer (2000), money market interest 
rate is set by monetary authorities in order to achieve the level of real interest rate 
that is required to produce some target level for inflation rate. This means that 
money market interest rate should be treated as a policy variable instead of being 
considered the result of the interactions between credit and money markets in 
general equilibrium.  
The so-called IS-RM model, developed by Romer, was the first attempt to bring real 
word  monetary  policy  procedures  to  macroeconomic  modeling.  This  model, 
however,  had  no  room  at  all  for  financial  intermediation  to  affect  aggregate 
demand and output. Changes in the rate of inflation and in the level of real output 
are the result of changes in the position of the IS curve (caused by changes in fiscal 
policy and/or in the expectations of the private sector) or in the position of the MR 
(monetary policy rule) curve (caused by changes of target level of inflation and/or 
changes in the weights of inflation and output in the loss function of the Central 
Bank). Last but not least, the level of money stock has no importance at all for the 
determination of output or inflation. The monetary policy of the IS-RM model is a 
policy where money does not matter. 
More recently, Bofinger (2001) had built a macroeconomic model that tried to 
integrate the financial intermediation feature of the Bernanke-Blinder model with 
the “exogenous” character of money market interest rate. In the so-called IS-CM 
model there are two interest rates: the credit or banking interest rate, determined 
by the interactions between goods market and credit market clearing conditions, 
and the money market interest rate, set by monetary authorities. One of the main   2
theoretical results of the model is that an increase of credit default risk – caused by 
a decrease of banks´ state of confidence regarding the ability of borrowers to repay 
their debt – will reduce the supply of banking credit, increasing the credit interest 
rate (and banking spread), causing a contraction of aggregate demand and real 
output. As a result of the contraction in the supply of credit, money stock will also 
fall even if Central Bank does not change the level of money market interest rate. 
This  means  that  a  monetary  contraction  is  compatible  with  a  situation  of  a 
constant short-term nominal interest rate.  
Up to now no efforts are made in the way to analyse the dynamics of Bofinger 
model  under  different  assumptions  about the  determination  of  money  market 
interest rate. The literature on monetary policy usually treats the issue of money 
market interest rate determination by means of a Taylor Rule, according to which 
changes in the value of money rare are the result of deviations of inflation from 
some target long-run level and/or deviations of output from full-employment level. 
Taylor rule can be considered the synthesis between two alternative policy rules: 
the  strict  inflation  targeting  rule,  according  to  which  nominal  interest  rate 
responds only to deviations of inflation from its long-run target; and strict output 
targeting (or Keynesian monetary policy) according to which nominal interest rate 
responds only to deviations of output from the full-employment level.   
The objective of this paper is to analyse the stability properties of Bofinger model 
under  different  monetary  policy  rules.  More  specifically  we  will  consider  four 
different cases: (a) strict inflation targeting; (b) strict inflation targeting plus anti-
cyclical  fiscal  policy;  (c)  strict  output  targeting  and  (d)  “double  mandate”  for 
Central  Bank  (output  and  inflation  stabilization).  As  we  will  see,  long-run 
equilibrium of the model can be stable only in cases (a) and (d); which means that 
the existence of nominal anchor is of fundamental importance for macroeconomic 
stability. We also conclude that an anti-cyclical fiscal policy is incompatible with 
macroeconomic stability under a strict inflation targeting regime.  
2.  The IS-CM-PC Model  
The IS-CM model developed by Bofinger considered inflation to be constant or 
equal to zero. In this section, we will present a slight modified version of IS-CM 
model in order to introduce inflation as a third endogenous variable. This new 
version will be called IS-CM-PC model since we will also add the Phillips Curve (PC) 
equation within model´s basic structure.  
The economy under analysis will be a closed one, where output is homogenous and 
can be either consumed or invested. There are two interest rates: one for credit 
operations  and  other  for  operations  in  money  market.  Money  and  credit  are 
considered to be perfect substitutes so that credit interest rate is the opportunity   3
cost  for  holding  money  and  supply  of  money  is  determined  by  the  supply  of 
banking credit. We will suppose that credit market is competitive so that banking 
rate is determined by demand and supply of credit. Since Central Bank set the 
money market interest rate, banks can get all the reserves they want in the money 
market at the rate fixed by monetary authorities. In other words, money is a full 
endogenous variable within the model at hand. This feature of monetary policy 
procedures gives a high level of elasticity to the supply of banking credit.  
Output is demand determined in the short-run which means that goods market is 
not competitive since there is some level of price stickiness in the system, a feature 
that requires, at least, imperfect competition in goods market (Gali, 2008, p.5). 
Inflation is determined by inflation expectations and output gap according to the 
standard formulation of the Phillips curve equation.  
  2.1 Building blocks of the model 
    2.1.1 Equilibrium in credit market 
  Demand for credit (equal to demand for money) is considered to be a positive 
function of output, due to transaction motive for money demand, and a negative 
function of the credit rate of interest, since the alternative of holding money is to 
pay debts.  This means that demand for credit can be expressed by the following 
equation:  
     (1)  
ere:   is the demand for credit; Y is real output or income;   is the credit 
interest rate.  
    Supply of credit is considered to be a positive function of the banking mark-up 
(i.e the difference between the credit rate of interest and the money market rate),  
a positive function of real output and a negative function of the bank´s state of 
confidence about debtor´s ability to repay their debt. Following Bofinger (2001), 
we will suppose that credit supply is given by:  
         (2)
1 
Where:   is the supply of credit, n is the number of banks in the banking sector, i 
is the money market interest rate,   is the credit rate of interest and   is the 
bank´s state of confidence. This equation indicates that banks will offer loans only 
if there is a positive interest rate margin. This results is due to the assumption that 
                                                         
1 For a detailed derivation of this equation from first principles see Bofinger (2001, ch.3).    4
form the perspective of a individual bank both, volume of deposits and the deposit 
rate have no impact on the optimal supply of loans (Bofinger, 2001).  
Finally, credit market clearing condition implies that
2:  
           (3) 
Equation (3) determines the CM loci; that is the loci of all possible combinations 
between output and credit rate of interest for which credit market clears.  
In order to determine the slope of CM loci we will take the first derivative of 
equation (3) in relation to Y and  . We get the following expression:  
  (4) 
From (3), it is easy to check that:   and  , that is: an increase in the 
money market interest rate produces an increase in the level of interest rate that 
clears the credit market; an increase in the bank´s subjective evaluations about  
debtor´s risk of default will also increase the banking rate of interest. 
  2.1.2 Equilibrium in the goods market 
  We will consider a closed economy with government activities. Consumption 
expenditures are supposed to be a function of disposable income only, so that 
there are no interest or wealth effects in the consumption function. Investment 
expenditures are  supposed to be a function of (real) credit interest  rate,  since 
investment  expenditures  are  financed  by  bank  loans.  For  sake  of  simplicity, 
government expenditures   are supposed to be autonomous and taxes (T) are 
lump-sum. 
  Equilibrium in goods market is given by:    
                (5) 
Where: Y is the current level of output,   is the autonomous expenditure 
multiplier,  ,   is the primary fiscal surplus,   is 
the expected rate of inflation.  
  II.1.3 Inflation and output: the Phillips curve.  
                                                         
2  In  order  to  assure  a  positive  equilibrium  value  for  the  real  output  level  we  have  to  suppose 
    5
  Inflation is supposed to be a function of expected rate of inflation and output 
gap,  defined  as  the  difference  between  current  level  of  output  and  its  “full-
employment” level. We have the following equation for inflation determination:  
               (6) 
Where:   is the current level of inflation,   is the “full-employment” output.  
2.2 Temporary General Equilibrium and Comparative Statics.  
Following Hicks (1946), we will analyse first the temporary general equilibrium
3 of 
the model; i.e. that state of the economy where goods, credit and money markets 
clear given expectations regarding future rate of inflation. In the temporary general 
equilibrium, policy variables (money market interest rate and primary surplus) are 
supposed to be constant, since changes in monetary and fiscal policy are induced 
by the state of the economy; which means that some time is required for a policy 
change to be induced by a particular state of the economy at hand.  
We will assume that conditions required by Brower´s fixed point theorem
4 are met 
so  that  a  temporary  general  equilibrium  exists.  A  visual  representation  of  the 
model at equilibrium can be done by Figure 1 above.  
 
                                                         
3 The temporary general equilibrium model was  developed  by Hicks (1946) in order to represent a 
sequential economy where transactions are made at each point of time. Markets are supposed to be 
incomplete, since it is impossible to trade contingent claims over all possible state of nature. In other 
words, there is no such a thing as Arrow´s sucurities.  
4 See Varian (1992, p. 320).  
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    For the comparative statics of the model, we will write equations (3), (5) and (6) 
in implicit form:  
                    (7a) 
                (7b) 
                       (7c) 
 Taking total derivatives of the system of equations (7ª)-(7c) we get:  
                   (8ª) 
                 (8b) 
                                           (8c) 
  Putting (8a) in (8c) we arrive at the following expression:  
     (9) 
  From (9) we can conclude that in temporary general equilibrium it is true that: 
; i.e. an increase in the primary surplus will decrease banking rate of interest; 
, i.e. an increase in the expected rate of inflation will increase the banking rate 
of interest;  , i.e. an increase in the money market rate of interest will increase 
the banking rate and  , i.e. an increase in the bank´s subjective evaluation about 
borrowers´ default risk will also increase the banking rate of interest.  
Writing (7a) in the inverse form we have:  
                     (7a´) 
Putting (7a´) in (7b) and taking the total derivative of the resulting expression we get:  
             (10) 
From (10) we can conclude that:  ,  ,  ,  .  
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3 – Stability Analysis of Different Monetary Policy Rules.  
  In the temporary general equilibrium, both inflation expectations and policy 
variables  are  kept  constant. We  will  now  turn  our attention  to  the “long-run” 
solution of the model where both type of variables  adjusts to the state of the 
economy.  
  In order to do that, we have to specify the monetary policy rules followed by 
monetary authorities. We will consider three cases: (a) strict inflation targeting, (b) 
active monetary policy rule and (c) Taylor rule. As it will be show, in case (a) the 
system  can  be  dynamically  stable;  i.e.  converge  to  a  steady  state  or  long-run 
equilibrium position. This will happen if the speed of adjustment of money market 
interest rate to divergences between current inflation and the long-run target for 
this variable is higher than some critical level. Case (c) can also be dynamically 
stable  if  the  ratio  between  weight  of  inflation  and  weight  of  output  in  the 
monetary policy rule is higher than some critical level. In case (b), where monetary 
policy aims only to stabilize the level of output around its “full-employment” value, 
the system will be dynamically unstable for all possible values of the parameters of 
the dynamic equations. These results show that a “conservative” monetary policy 
is  required  by  macroeconomic  stability.  Finally,  we  will  analyze  the  joint 
interaction of a strict inflation targeting and an  anti-cyclical fiscal policy where 
primary surplus is  reduced  (increased)  whenever output  is lower  (higher)  than 
“full-employment”  output.  As  we  will  see,  the  system  will  be  also  dynamically 
unstable,  which  means  that fiscal policy should  not be  used  for  stabilizing  the 
economy.  
3.1.1 Adaptive expectations and strict inflation targeting.  
  Let  us  consider  a  dynamical  system  where  the  time  path  of  inflation 
expectations and money market interest rate are given by:  
                  (11) 
                  (12) 
Equation (11) shows that inflation expectations are adaptive in the sense that they 
are revised according to the expectations errors committed by economic agents. It 
is  important  to  notice  that  equation  (11)  will  be  compatible  with  rational 
expectations hypothesis (identical to perfect foresight in a deterministic world) if 
.  
Equation  (12)  shows  that  monetary  authorities  will  change  the  money  market 
interest  rate  only  as  a  reaction  against  deviations  of  current  inflation  to  the   8
inflation target, which is exogenously given. This means that monetary authorities 
follow a monetary rule that can be named “strict inflation targeting”, since the only 
concern of monetary policy is to stabilize the rate of inflation around its long-run 
target.  
We  will  consider  the  dynamical  stability  of  the  system  around  its  long-run 
equilibrium position. In order to that, we will take a linear approximation of the 
system around its equilibrium position by means of the first element of the Taylor 
expansion. After that, we get the following expression in matrix form:  
                  (13) 
  Dynamical stability of the system requires that trace and determinant of the 
Jacobian matrix are negative and positive, respectively. From (13) we get:   
             (14) 
               (15) 
  In equation (15) we can see that the trace of Jacobian matrix can be positive or 
negative depending on the magnitudes of the first and the second element of the 
expression at hand. This means that speed of adjustment of money market interest 
rate will be of fundamental importance for the stability of the system. In fact, Trace 
will  be  positive  if  and  only  if:  ;  i.e.  the  speed  of 
adjustment of money market interest rate must be higher than some critical level 
 in order for the system to converge to its long-run equilibrium.  
  The problem with this result is that stylized facts about monetary policy and 
central banking shows the existence of a phenomenon known as “interest rate 
smoothing”; i.e. the empirical behavior of money market interest rates exhibits a 
very high level of inertia in the time series of this variable (Barbosa, 2004). This 
means  that  the  observed  stability  of  inflation  targeting  economies  cannot  be 
attributed to this kind of response of short-term interest rate. Observe that this 
result is close to that one found in Gali (2008). Note that in contrast with the 
“contemporaneous”  rule,  determinacy  of  equilibrium  requires  that  the  Central 
Bank reacts neither too strongly nor too weekly to deviations of inflation   
   3.1.2 Adaptive expectations, strict inflation targeting and anti-cyclical fiscal 
policy.    9
  As we had seen above, the adoption of a monetary policy rule based in a strict 
inflation targeting is compatible with dynamical stability of the economy at hand. 
However, this result requires a high speed of adjustment of money market interest 
rates which is in contradiction to the empirical behavior of these variables.  
  These  observations  made  us  to  investigate  if  dynamical  stability  can  be 
achieved by the addition of an anti-cyclical fiscal policy in the framework at hand. 
In  this  setting,  monetary  policy  would  be  responsible  for  the  stabilization  of 
inflation around its long-run target whereas fiscal policy would be responsible for 
the stabilization of output around its “full-employment” level. This framework of 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy  should  then  be  considered  a  synthesis  between 
“Monetarist” and “Keynesian” principles of economic policy.  
  The dynamical system of equations is given by:  
            (11) 
                 (12) 
               (16) 
In equation (16) we can see that primary surplus will increase (decrease) whenever 
actual  output  is  above  (below)  “full-employment”  level.    This  is  the  essence  of 
Keynesian demand management policies.  
Taking a linear approximation of the system around  its equilibrium position by 
means of the first element of the Taylor expansion, and writing the resulting system in 
matrix form we get: 
            (17) 
 
Theorem  1.  (Routh-Hurwitz  Criteria).  Given  the  polynomial, 
  where  the  coefficients    are  real 
constants,  , define the   Hurwitz matrices using the coefficients    the 
characteristic polynomial:  
,  ,      10
and    , where   All the roots of 
the polynomial   are negative or have negative real part if the determinants of 
all Hurwitz matrices are positive:  .  
For a proff of the Routh-Hurwitz criteria, see Gantmacher (1964).  
Corollary: Suppose the coefficients of the polynomial are real. If all the roots of the 
characteristic  polynomial    are 
negative or have negative real parts, then the coefficients   for  . 
Proof. The corollary is a direct consequence of the Routh-Hurwitz criteria. The 
characteristic equation can be factored into the form: 
 
Where  the  roots  are    and  the  complex  roots  are 
 and . If all of the roots are either negative 
or have negative real part, then  and   for all   and  . Thus, all the 
coefficients in the factored characteristic equation are positives.  
Remark. Routh’s stability criteria describe how many roots have positive real part. 
The remaining roots have negative or zero real part. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for all roots to have strictly negative real part is that all coefficients in the 
polynomial   are strictly positive, i.e. no zero coefficients. 
Stability analysis of a 3x3 system of linear differential equations is made by means 
of Routh-Hurwitz theorem (Takayama, 1993). The characteristic equation of the 
system (17) is given by:  
                                                 (18) 
Where: 
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Since D=0, the conditions required for the stability of the system are not satisfied, 
for the results of the corollary 1, the long-run equilibrium is dynamically unstable. 
This means that an anti-cyclical fiscal policy is incompatible with dynamic stability 
under a strict inflation targeting regime.  
4 – Summary of the results 
In the  present  paper  we  have  analysed  the  stability  properties  of  Bofinger 
(2001) model under different monetary policy rules. We have considered four different 
cases: (a) strict inflation targeting; (b) strict inflation targeting plus anti-cyclical fiscal 
policy; (c) strict output targeting and (d) “double mandate” for Central Bank (output 
and  inflation  stabilization).  As  it  was  shown  by  stability  analysis  of  the  system  of 
differential equations, long-run equilibrium of the model can be stable only in cases (a) 
and (d); which means that the existence of nominal anchor such a certain target for 
inflation rate is of fundamental importance for macroeconomic stability. However, it is 
also  true  that  a  “Keynesian  activist  monetary  policy”  is  not  incompatible  with 
macroeconomic  stability.  We  also  conclude  that  an  anti-cyclical  fiscal  policy  is 
incompatible with macroeconomic stability under a strict inflation targeting regime. 
The stabilization of output should be a task for monetary policy that operates under a 
“double mandate” for Central Bank. Fiscal policy must be concerned with other issues 
such as, for example, stabilization of public debt.  
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